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This thesis analyzes the political, economic, energy and military determinants of China’s 
use of force policy in South and East China Seas in the post-Cold War era. Considering 
China’s international behavior throughout the Cold War years, three possible 
explanations are formulated at the beginning of the study. The first one posits that China 
has not changed its realist international attitude after the Cold War and its conciliatory 
behaviors are only exceptional for other reasons. The second postulates that China has 
displayed behavior different from its earlier approaches to the regional disputes since 
1990s. The third suggests that China has not behaved consistently and it is not possible to 
determine any single pattern. Since the end of the Cold War, deepening political and 
economic integration and increasing investment in alternative energy resources 
discouraged Chinese decision-makers from resorting to the military forces at first place to 
settle the disputes and forced Beijing to adopt more cooperative strategies. However, 
regarding the regional militarization, it is difficult to determine the effects of military 
balance on the Chinese international crisis behaviors. After evaluating the determinants 
and China’s dispute behavior together last two decades, this thesis concludes that the 
threshold of the Chinese use of force in South and East China Seas has elevated and 
Beijing has not behaved so belligerently since 1990s as it did during the Cold War years. 
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Scholars have analyzed China’s behavior in disputes since 1949. Some of them, 
such as John Mearsheimer, Avery Goldstein, and Thomas Christensen, conclude that 
China has displayed assertiveness and belligerence in most of its international disputes, 
that realist calculations have dominated PRC leaders’ thinking, and that they likely will 
continue to do so. On the other hand, Taylor Fravel has pointed out that China used force 
only six out of twenty three territorial conflicts and offered concessions in seventeen of 
them since 1949.1 Furthermore, Alastair Iain Johnston has shown that China’s growing 
military and economic power has not increased its proneness to use military force even 
while territorial integrity and international status remain essential determiners of China’s 
use of force decisions from 1949 to 1992.2   
Amidst the debate between these two camps, this thesis seeks to answer two 
major questions: (1) What factors determine China’s use of force decision? (2) Which 
one of the two trajectories, confrontational or conciliatory, has China pursued since the 
end of the Cold War?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
 Although Chinese leaders state that China will not collide with other powers and 
will contribute to international system by its “peaceful rise,” the question whether China 
will comply with the international and regional order or challenge it remains 
unanswered.3 Arguably, the PLA’s expanding new missions indicate Beijing’s 
                                                 
1 M. Taylor Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation Explaining China’s Use of Force,” International 
Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 46. 
2Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Data,” The China Quarterly, no. 153 
(March, 1998), 28. 
3 The National Institute for Defense, China Security Report, (Tokyo: The National Institute for 
Defense Studies, 2011), 14, http://www.nids.go.jp. [hereafter cited as CSR]; David Lai and Marc Miller, 
“Introduction,” in Beyond The Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009), 22; Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, “Assessing Chinese Military 
Transparency,” China Strategic Perspectives 1 (Washington: National Defense University, 2010), 4, 
www.ndu.edu/inss. 
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abandonment of “low profile,” “biding-time” approach, and its increasing demands on 
the international system.4 Thus, China’s new international and regional posture since 
President Hu Jintao’s declaration of the PLA’s new missions in 2004 has become 
increasingly important.  
It is commonly believed that China’s behavior will likely determine the regional 
and (arguably) the international stability. Therefore, identifying the factors that may 
influence China to adopt more assertive approaches to international disputes and trying to 
understand the emerging tendency in PRC thinking may facilitate our estimation of the 
course of the future. This thesis lays out the political, economic, energy, and military 
determinants of China’s use of military force decisions and evaluates their effects on 
PRC behavior in recent disputes. At the end, it assesses whether there has been an 
evolution in Chinese thinking or not.       
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Scholars analyzing China’s decisions to use its military power to settle 
international disputes since 1949 have suggested various frameworks to explain why and 
when China resorted to military force and how it may do so in the future as well. 
Proponents of power transition theory argue that when a “dissatisfied” China feels strong 
enough to cope with the United States, it will project its power to establish its own 
international order. These scholars see conflict over territorial issues as inevitable 
between dominant powers.5 Others apply preventive strike theory to PRC history. Aside 
from their varied interpretations, they basically argue that, contrary to the power 
transition theory, China has used its military power when it felt itself vulnerable to its 
                                                 
4 Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” 20; Elinor Sloan, “U.S.-China Military and Security Developments,” 
International Journal 66, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 271–272. 
5 Avery Goldstein, “Power Transition, Institutions, and China’s Rise in East Asia,” in The United 
States and Northeast Asia, 51–55; Jack S. Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” in 
China’s Ascent, 13–14. 
 
 3 
adversaries’ increasing power.6 Finally, some scholars emphasize “status discrepancy.” 
They argue that the wider the gap between a state’s “self-conception” and “ascribed 
status,” the more likely this country may resort to aggressive ways to close this 
discrepancy.7  
The overlapping argument of these theories is that power differences, either in 
positive or negative direction, may stimulate China’s assertiveness. Power transition 
theory anticipates this discrepancy as a result of China’s growing power vis-à-vis 
regional powers and the United States while the preemptive strike and status-
inconsistency theorists watch for comparative power decline. Admittedly, it is difficult to 
measure this gap objectively and determine the size that may lead to the use of military 
force. Additionally, a similar gap may result in different outcomes at the same time. For 
example, Mao may have seen favorable balance of power over Paracel Islands in 1974 
and used military force to settle the territorial dispute preemptively, but a similarly 
advantageous position may not prompt Chinese leaders to behave in this manner due to 
some other conditions. It is obvious that the threshold for using military power is not 
fixed and changes under different circumstances. This thesis aims to determine the 
regional factors and their influence on Chinese decision decision-making. 
Basing on the research questions, three hypotheses may be formulated. The first 
one posits that China has not changed its traditional international posture and distinct 
behaviors are only exceptional for other reasons. In that case, any military confrontation 
is likely to occur at any time. The second hypothesis postulates that China has displayed 
behavior different from its earlier approaches to the regional disputes, since 1990s. In that 
case, one should not expect China to occupy Scarborough Shoal in 2012 as it did 
Mischief Reef in 1994. The third suggests that China has not behaved consistently and it 
is not possible to determine any single pattern. The conclusion of this study is that the 
                                                 
6 Thomas J. Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,” in New 
Directions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, 
2006), 53; M. Taylor Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation Explaining China’s Use of Force,” International 
Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 46. 
7 Nicholas Scott Bauer, “How Do You Like Me Now? Status-Inconsistency Theory as an Explanation 
for China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes” (Master thesis, Georgetown University, 2010), 7–11. 
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threshold of using military force has risen for China. Regional political, economic, 
energy, and military relations caused this change.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the existing literature, scholars’ arguments coalesce around several factors that 
are posited as influencing China’s use of force decisions. The theories described above 
also utilize some of these factors as foundations for their arguments. China’s level of 
satisfaction with the existing international structure, its growing military capabilities 
thanks to its military modernization efforts, its sensitivity about sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, the transformation of its defense strategy in accordance with its 
increasingly advanced weapons, PLA leaders’ perceptions of the domestic and 
international issues, Beijing’s threat perception in its changing security environment, the 
country’s needs to sustain its economic growth, and China’s endeavor to attain “great 
power” status seem to affect Beijing decisions with regard to resorting to military options 
to solve problems.    
Scholars have differing views about China’s “peaceful development.” While some 
reveal concerns, others are more relaxed. Scobell and Wortzel argue that the United 
States military policy influences China’s international behavior.8 Additionally, China’s 
level of satisfaction with the international structure and its level of integration into this 
system also matter, and this affects PRC military and expansionist strategies to establish 
its own regional hegemony.9 Conversely, Zhu Liqun and Bitzinger are confident that a 
“neo-internationalist” pattern is dominant in China for now. Zhu further argues that 
                                                 
8 Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, 
Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 
102. 
9 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Analyzing Chinese Military Expenditures,” in The People’s Liberation Army 





despite China’s economic prosperity and growing military capability, PRC leaders are not 
inclined to follow “military adventures.”10  
China’s international posture is debated also within PRC. Some Chinese 
commentators advocate that a more powerful China be “more proactive, assertive, and 
candid.” Despite the U.S. decline, China still lacks a sufficiently assertive approach. 
China should have taken a stronger position against U.S.-South Korea joint exercises in 
Yellow Sea in 2010 and during other South China Sea tensions, in accordance with its 
expanding comprehensive national power and growing international status. They argue 
that China’s security interests have changed drastically since the Deng era and Beijing 
must implement firmer policies vis-à-vis the United States. On the other hand, others 
support Deng Xiaoping’s legacy from the early 1990s. That is, China should “observe 
calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our 
time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”11 
The PLA’s growing capabilities as a result of its military modernization efforts, 
which flow from China’s expanding national interests and increasing security needs, 
worry the region. These worries are compounded by the lack of transparency regarding 
its intentions and actual capabilities. Yang states that after 2002, military modernization 
has become as important as economic growth in Chinese thinking.12 It is assumed that 
PRC leaders may resort to assertive behaviors once they feel confident about their 
capabilities. Mitchell describes the PLA’s increasing abilities as capable of 
“unprecedented power projection” in the PLA’s history.”13 Furthermore, Pradun argues 
that China’s missile technology and C4ISR architecture are much more ambitious than 
                                                 
10 Bitzinger, “Analyzing Chinese Military Expenditures”; Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy 
Debates,” Chaillot Papers (September 2010) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2010): 50–51. 
www.iss.europa.eu. 
11 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), 17–19. [hereafter cited as OSD 
Report].17–19. 
12 Andrew Yang, “The Military of the People’s Republic of China: Strategy and Implementation,” 
UNISCI Discussion Papers 17 (May 2008): 191–192, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/2 24081458? accountid=12702. 
13 Derek J. Mitchell, “Military Modernization,” in China’s Rise: Challenge and Opportunities 
(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2008), 197–199. 
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denial strategy.14 In addition, some commentators are clear in their predictions that the 
PLA wants these capabilities to take initiative, prevent escalation, and “contain or control 
war,” in addition to sustaining sea and area denial, conducting preemptive strikes.15 
China’s sensitivity over sovereignty and territorial integrity has been the main 
cause of China’s militarist adventures. Evan Medeiros and his colleagues argue that 
“sovereignty” includes territorial claims in South China Sea, according to the PLA 
literature.16 The 2011 OSD report to Congress on China military power explicitly states 
that China is preparing its military for any potential crisis in South and East China Seas. 
Beijing wants to establish a buffer zone to prevent an attack and advance its territorial 
claims in these regions.17 Cozad points out any possible solution to the Taiwan question 
or changing strategic priorities may result in reorientation of the PLA toward South and 
East China Seas.18 Contrary to these prevalent concerns about China’s assertive maritime 
territorial claims, as seen in the 2010 Senkaku Islands confrontation, the 2011 OSD 
report also points out that the Chinese government wants to treat the maritime territorial 
disputes as “law enforcement issue,” not a military rivalry, but those disputes are still 
central in PLA planning.19  
China’s developing military strategy is thought to include elements of use of force 
in some ways. China’s overall “active defense” military strategy envisions preemptive 
strike if another country has even hostile “political” ambitions with respect to China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. China’s readiness to use force in the South and East 
                                                 
14 Vitaliy Pradun, “From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts: China’s Missile Revolution and PLA 
Strategy against U.S. Military Intervention,” Naval War College Review 64. 2. (Spring 2011): 15–16. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/857079307?accountid=12702. 
15 Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constrains, (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2005), 200, http://www.rand.org; Scobell and Wortzel, China’s Growing Military 
Power, 85; Lonnie D. Henley, “War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management,” in Shaping 
China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2006), 6.  
16 Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, 198. 
17 OSD Report, 59–60. 
18 Mark Cozad, “China’s Regional Power Projection: Prospects For Future Missions in the South and 
East China Seas,” in Beyond The Strait PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 306. 
19 OSD Report, 15. 
 7 
China Seas under a “preemptive strategy” causes great concerns.20 Accordingly, the PLA 
focuses on naval warfare to carry out operations in the first and second island chains in 
order to implement “offshore defense,” in other words, a “near seas defense” strategy. 
These operations include the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea regions.21 
PLA leaders’ opinions are also believed to affect China’s decision-making with 
regard to assertiveness and use of force. Some commentators argue that 
professionalization may make the PLA leaders more nationalistic. Becoming more 
dominant, nationalistic commanders may see territorial issues as more vital than 
economic growth, while the CCP leaders are mostly concerned with the latter. As a 
result, the PLA leaders may urge use of force to carry out “new missions.”22 As David 
Lai states, some “hawkish” commanders who are encouraged by the PLA’s growing 
power assert that China should abandon its posture of low profile, hiding intentions, and 
biding time. Instead, it should show its “true colors.”23 However, others argue that PLA 
leaders do not display a monolithic approach to the issues.24 How PLA leaders’ 
perspectives can influence the China’s strategic thinking therefore is not easy to answer.  
Threat perception is another determinant with regard to China’s power projection 
when it needs. Territorial defense against an imminent surprise attack from South and 
East China Seas and winning the local wars under “informationized” conditions to secure 
                                                 
20 James R. Lilley, “Introduction,” in People’s Liberation Army after Next, edited by Susan M. Puska 
(Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 7–8. 
21OSD Report, 22–25; Sloan, “U.S.-China Military and Security Developments,” 272.; Nan Li, “PLA 
Conservative Nationalism,” in The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition, ed. Stephen J. 
Flanagan et al. (Washington: National Defense University, 2003), 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/nduedu/www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/05_ch01.ht
m.  
22 Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, 192; Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti, “The 
PLA in a Changing China: An Overview,” in The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition, ed. 
Stephen J. Flanagan et al. (Washington: National Defense University,2003), 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/nduedu/www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/05_ch01.ht
m; James J. Mulvenon, “The PLA Army’s Struggle for Identity,” in The People’s Liberation Army and 
China in Transition, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan et al. (Washington: National Defense University, 2003), 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/nduedu/www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/05_ch01.ht
m. 
23 David Lai, “Coming of Chinese Hawk,” (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 
1–3. 
24 OSD Report, 35; CRS, 3; Kiselycznyk and Saunders, “Assessing Chinese Military Transparency,” 
4; Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” 22. 
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China’s national interests and unity require PLA involvement in the disputes.25 A 
perceived U.S. containment policy and military capabilities to project power, the U.S.-
Japan security alliance, perceptions of Japan’s resurgent militarism, the U.S.-Southeast 
Asian security alliances, India’s growing influence in South Asia, and its regional 
hegemony are major threats that China perceives in the region.26 Consequently, these 
threats stimulate Beijing to advance its military capabilities and its preparations for any 
contingency. These threats also prioritize military perspectives toward the region. As 
Robert Sutter points out, Beijing perceives Sino-Japanese rivalry in a security and 
historical context rather than as economic and diplomatic.27 PLA leaders are enthusiastic 
about curbing India’s influence and regional hegemony.28 Although China prefers to use 
its soft power in Southeast Asia, the PLA’s capabilities strengthen the Chinese presence 
and advance country’s security interests in the region.29  
Some scholars argue that sustaining economic growth may also require China to 
use military force. As Hu Jintao has repeated, economic development is China’s central 
objective and the PLA is obliged to provide a favorable security environment to achieve 
this goal. The 2011 OSD report states that, according to 2010 National Defense White 
Paper (NDWP), the PLA will maintain its “active defense” principle and its “no first use 
                                                 
25 Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, 192; Yang, “The Military of the People’s Republic of 
China,”194; Mark A. Stokes, “Foundations of Strategic Modernization,” in China’s Strategic 
Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 
1999), 13. 
26 Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, 193–199; Susan M. Puska, “Assessing America at War: 
Implications for China’ Military Modernization and National Security,” in Shaping China’s Security 
Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2006), 6; David M. Filkelstein, “China’s ‘New Concept of Security,’” in The People’s Liberation Army and 
China in Transition, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan et al. (Washington: National Defense University, 2003), 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/nduedu/www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/05_ch01.ht
m.  
27Robert G. Sutter, “The PLA, Japan’s Defense Posture, and the Outlook for China-Japan Relations,” 
in Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 9.  
28 Srikanth Kondapalli, “The Chinese Military Eyes South Asia,” in Shaping China’s Security 
Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2006), 10. 
29 Larry M. Wortzel, “China And Southeast Asia: Building Influence, Addressing Fears,” in Shaping 
China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2006), 11, 12. 
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(NFU)” nuclear strategy to enhance the “national strategic capabilities” to foster secure 
environment.30 Michael McDevitt claimed in 1999 that “China is in the strategic dilemma 
between continuing economic development by taking advantage of its continental 
dominance and investing in militarization and expanding toward maritime Asia.31 
However, Lai and Miller argue that China’s economic development itself required power 
projection to protect expanding economic interests and resource supply lines in maritime 
Asia. Protecting import routes for resources and energy is critical for sustaining economic 
development, in addition to other maritime interests.32 Therefore, China links its 
economic welfare and national security in the maritime domain on SLOC protection 
operations.33  
China’s desire to realize the “great power status” seems another compelling factor 
with respect to its interests in power projecting, upgrading its military, and expanding 
toward open seas.34 Many observers believe that China wants an “intimidating” military 
capacity to change the balance of power in the region, to develop powerful naval forces 
equal to its growing national power, to meet the country’s growing trade and resource 
needs, to cover the distance to its territorial claims and first island chain defense, and to 
discourage the U.S. surveillance activities and other nations’ claims on the islands.”35 
Mitchell argues that China’s growing international stature stimulates it to develop its 
                                                 
30 OSD Report, 47. 
31 Michael McDevitt, “Geographic Ruminations,” in The Chinese Armed Forces in 21st Century, ed. 
Larry M. Wortzel, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 5. 
32 CSR, 42; Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” 10. 
33 OSD Report, 57–58; Sloan, “U.S.-China Military and Security Developments,” 269. 
34 Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, (xxii); Stokes, “Foundations of Strategic 
Modernization,” 13; Ellis Joffe, “China’s Military Buildup: Beyond Taiwan?,” in Shaping China’s Security 
Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2006),4; James R Holmes and Yoshihara Toshi, “China And The United States “in The Indian Ocean: An 
Emerging Strategic Triangle?” Naval War College Review 61.3, (Summer 2008): 40, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/2 05941763?accountid=12702. 
35 Scobell and Wortzel, China’s Growing Military Power, 65; David Lai, “China’s Maritime Quest,” 
(Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 1–2; John Tkacik, “Taiwan Politics and 
Leadership,” in The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan et al. 




military capability more conspicuously.36 The 2011 OSD report states that this trend 
manifests either a shift from “offshore defense” to “far seas defense” or adjustment in 
“offshore defense” and seen as “historic task” for the PLA. The report also argues that, 
although China’s maritime interests such as territorial claims, resource interests, and 
SLOC dependence are in Asia, China seeks global missions. According to the report, this 
tendency shows China’s desire to be a “great power.”37  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis focuses on the major confrontations in South and East China Sea 
regions, which may prefigure new Chinese approaches to territorial disputes, if any, since 
the end of the Cold War. In this thesis, I analyze the cases by utilizing the factors outlined 
in the literature review. In order to narrow down the scope of the study, I concentrate on 
the importance regional political, economic, energy, and security variables. After 
evaluating the developments, I reach some conclusions about the Beijing’s evolving 
attitudes toward the disputes and the trajectory it is following.       
Throughout this thesis, I use the think-tank reports and publications, journals of 
reputable scholars, and reliable historical and contemporary information from some 
Internet sources. I also utilize the Correlates of War Project’s actions and hostility scales 
to rate the intensity of the confrontations in South and East China Seas. Regarding the 
evidence, I look at China’s behaviors in current political and institutional structure, its 
economic relations with the other claimants, the implications of China’s growing energy 
needs on its behavior, and regional military balance in the security context. In the end, I 
try to find out the pattern that China has pursued since the end of the Cold War by 
evaluating its behaviors in South China Sea and East China Seas. 
                                                 
36 Derek J. Mitchell, “China and the World,” in China’s Rise: Challenge and Opportunities 
(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2008), 226. 
37 OSD Report, 57–59. 
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II. CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR  
Strategic culture implies “consistent and persistent historical patterns in the way 
particular states (or state elites) think about the use of force for political ends.”38 
Naturally, it imposes on decision-makers to behave in certain ways and limits their 
strategic choices that the conjectural strategic environment may offer. Because it includes 
decisions about use of force, military culture is not outside of the strategic culture’s 
sphere of influence. Regarding China, it has been widely asserted that the Chinese have a 
“nonviolent” strategic culture inherited from tradition, preferring diplomatic means rather 
than coercive measures. Beijing uses defensive and deterrent methods, and when it needs 
to use force, it employs it in controlled a manner. According to this view, the Chinese do 
not believe in the “efficacy of the violent” to achieve their strategic goals. They 
emphasize Confucianism which promotes the ruler’s moral integrity and good 
governance.39 However, the frequency of the militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) China 
has been involved in the Cold War era and their characteristics falsify this prevalent 
assertion, but the post-Cold War trend of its behaviors needs to be further investigated.  
A. COLD WAR YEARS 
1. Frequency of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs)  
It is obvious that realpolitik calculations dominated the Chines strategic thinking 
throughout the Cold War. During the post-1949 period, China’s international dispute 
behavior revealed highly militarized characteristics, contrary to its supposedly 
constrained strategic culture. According to Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDSs) data of 
Correlates of War Project, China is the second most dispute-prone state when we 
compare it with the other great powers both in the Cold War period and since the 
 
                                                 
38 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(New Jersey: Princeton University, 1995), 1.      
39 Ibid., 22–27; Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992: 
A First Cut at the Data,” The China Quarterly, no. 153 (1998), 7.              
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Napoleonic Wars.40 When we look at the disputes during the Cold War, China was the 
challenger state in 50.5 percent of the confrontations while being targeted in 49.5 percent 
of them.41  
 
Comparative Frequency of MIDs during the 
Cold War 






































Table 1.   Frequency of MIDs (From Johnston, 1998, p.9). 
2. The Influence of the International Developments on China’s 
Behaviors 
Some important developments in international society affected PRC’s 
belligerency. For example, as we see in the figures below, China’s involvement in MIDs 
and the hostility rate increased during 1954–58 and 1964–68 periods. It can be argued 
that Beijing was trying to break up the United States-Taiwan alliance in the former.42 
Furthermore, Mao may have tried to change a trend and shape the security environment 
after 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis.43 Regarding the 1964–68 period, Alastair Johnston 
points out that due to Mao’s efforts to consolidate the regime during Cultural Revolution 
(CR) China increased its assertiveness.44 In addition to this “diversionary war” argument, 
PRC’s international posture may have played a role as well. China’s predicament 
between two great powers after 1960 Sino-Soviet split and the encouragement after its 
                                                 
40 Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992,” 8, 9.  
41 Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer and Stuart Bremer, “Pre 1993 MID Data v.2.1.EE,” in Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, no. 21 (2004), October 13, 2012 , http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
42 Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992,” 10.  
43 Christensen, “Windows and War,” 59. 
44 Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992,” 10.  
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first atomic bomb test in 1964 may have increased its assertiveness. On the contrary, the 
frequency and average hostility score decreased during 1969–73 period (Figure 1 and 
Figure 2). Among other reasons, the difference between China’s desired status and the 
one the international system gave seems to have determined PRC’s behavior during this 
period.45 Although Johnston relates the falling rate to the CR, it is apparent that China’s 




Figure 1.  Average Hostility Score per MID in Each Five Year Period 
(From Johnston, 1998, p. 12).  
3. Characteristics of the MIDs 
The historical record indicates that the possibility of China’s use of military forces 
to settle the disputes is very high.46 As the Correlates of War Project classifies them, 
China engaged in three different types of MIDs since 1949. The first one is “territorial” 
disputes. China involved in more territorial dispute than the other two types especially by 
49 percent in its first decade (see Figure 3). The percentages of the other two types of 
disputes are 42.3 percent and 7 percent for “policy” and “regime,” respectively. The 
territorial issues have been the essential part of China’s core interests and PRC leaders 
have remained staunch reaching a compromise over them. However, China’s readiness to 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 2.  
46 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part One: On “Core Interests,” China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 34 (February), 7.             
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use force to realize its territorial ambitions became slightly lower than resorting to its 
military power in policy and regime disputes. As we see in the Figure 4, China used force 
in 80 percent of policy and regime issues while in 65 percent of the territorial disputes.47   
 
 
Figure 2.  Frequency of Chinese MIDs by Dispute Type per Five Year Period (Type 1 




Figure 3.  Chinese MID Hostility Level by Dispute Type (From Johnston, 1998, p.16). 
 
                                                 
47 Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992,” 15. 
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The key characteristics of Chinese use of force were: (1) surprise attacks to catch 
the enemy unprepared, to assert its standpoint, and to create psychological and political 
shock, as in Korea War in 1950 and India in 1962;48 and (2) opportunistic timing, as PLA 
employed attacks in Paracel Islands in 1974, the Spratly Islands in 1988, and Mischief 
Reef in 1995.49 Therefore, we can say that China may resort to its military force when it 
sees its adversaries as unprepared to defense their interests. Arguably in line with this 
logic, as we see in the Figure 5, China “clashed” only in 48 percent of the territorial 
disputes and mostly implemented other levels of actions.50 In other words, as history 
suggests, if its military power cannot achieve the goals above, it refrains from using it. 
Naturally, these international behaviors also imply that the Chinese leaders evaluate some 
variables and act accordingly. Even if it may be possible to create a model and find a 
pattern that could explain how and when China uses force, identical political, economic, 
and security circumstances may not produce the same outcomes. It means that the 
threshold of choosing military options may differ from time to time. Especially after the 
Cold War, the threshold of the Chinese use of force in South and East China Seas 
changed.   
 
 
Figure 4.  Chinese MID Action Level by Dispute Type (From Johnston,1998, p.17).  
                                                 
48 Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s use of Force (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 
2000), 5,10.           
49 Ibid., 15.  
50 Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992,” 17.  
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B. SOUTH CHINA SEA AND EAST CHINA SEA POST-1993 
1. Continuation of the Disputes 
Alastair Johnston argues that the more PRC consolidated its power, the less it 
involved in territorial disputes.51 However, since the end of the Cold War China, Beijing 
started to feel itself more capable, thanks to the economic growth and subsequent weapon 
procurements and modernizations, but nevertheless it has not refrained from resorting to 
force to realize its territorial claims. Although the PLA’s involvement and use of force in 
territorial disputes have been gradually decreasing since 1950s and 1960s, compared to 
regime and policy types of disputes, PRC still employs PLA forces in South and East 
China seas. Additionally, Johnston points out that China’s dispute-prone posture has not 
increased as its military and economic power grew since 1980s. In other words, the gap 
between its ascribed and desired international status decreased, so the number of MIDs. 
Therefore, a more powerful China does not necessarily mean more belligerent China.52 
On the contrary, it seems that the economic and military growth is not enough to close 
this gap. This time, China started to be harsher in its claims as a result of over-confidence 
deriving from its increasing hard power capabilities. 
2. Levels of Hostility and Military Action  
If we evaluate the major incidents in South and East China Seas according to the 
hostility and action levels of Correlates of War analyses in Table 2, we have the results in 
Table 3 and Table 4. Then, we will be able to see the trend of last two decades in these 






                                                 
51 Ibid., 28.  
52 Ibid., 29.  
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Hostility Level Description Action Level Description [Hostility level] 
1 No militarized action 
2 Threat to use force 
3 Display of force 
4 Use of force 
5 War 
 
0 No militarized action [1] 
1 Threat to use force [2] 
2 Threat to blockade [2] 
3 Threat to occupy territory [2] 
4 Threat to declare war [2] 
5 Threat to use CBR weapons [2] 
6 Threat to join war 
7 Show of force [3] 
8 Alert [3] 
9 Nuclear alert [3] 
10 Mobilization [3] 
11 Fortify border [3] 
12 Border violation [3] 
13 Blockade [4] 
14 Occupation of territory [4] 
15 Seizure [4] 
16 Attack [4] 
17 Clash [4] 
18 Declaration of war [4] 
19 Use of CBR weapons [4] 
20 Begin interstate war [5] 
21 Join interstate war [5] ‐9 Missing [‐9] 
Table 2.   Hostility and Action Levels (From Faten Ghosn and Scott Bennett, 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/Codebook%20for%20Dya 
c%20MID%20Data%20v3.10.pdf, accessed October 13, 2012).  
 
A B Type StMon StYear Act. Lev. 
Host. 
Lev. Ori A Ori B 
CHN VIE 1 6 1992 15 4 1 0 
CHN VIE 1 7 1992 14 4 1 0 
CHN VIE 1 7 1994 7 3 0 1 
CHN PHI 1   1994 14 4 1 0 
CHN MAL 1 3 1995 16 4 0 1 
CHN PHI 1 3 1995 0 1 0 1 
CHN PHI 1 1 1996 17 4 1 0 
CHN PHI 1 3 1997 10 3 1 0 
CHN PHI 1 4 1997 7 3 1 1 
CHN PHI 1 1 1998 15 4 0 1 
CHN PHI 1 5 1999 1 2 1 0 
CHN PHI 1 5 1999 10 3 1 1 
CHN PHI 1 6 1999 10 3 1 1 
CHN PHI 1 5 2000 16 4 0 1 
CHN PHI 1 1 2001 15 4 0 1 
CHN PHI 1 3 2001 7 3 0 1 
CHN USA 2 3 2009 10 3 1 0 
CHN USA 2 6 2009 10 3 1 0 
CHN INS 1 5 2010 15 4 1 1 
CHN INS 1 6 2010 10 3 0 1 
CHN PHI 1 2 2011 7 3 1 0 
CHN PHI 1 3 2011 1 2 0 1 
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CHN VIE 1 6 2011 7 3 0 1 
CHN VIE 1 7 2011 16 4 1 0 
CHN PHI 1 10 2011 16 4 0 1 
CHN VIE 1 3 2012 15 4 1 0 
CHN PHI 1 4 2012 10 3 1 1 
CHN PHI 1 4 2012 7 3 0 1 
Table 3.   South China Sea after the End of the Cold War Source (Author’s own 
calculations from the events list,  http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline).  
A B Type StMon StYear Act. Lev. 
Host. 
Lev. Ori A Ori B 
CHN JPN 1 8 1995 7 3 1 1 
CHN JPN 1 7 1996 7 3 1 1 
CHN JPN 1 5 1999 7 3 1 1 
CHN JPN 1 11 2003 7 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 1 2004 16 4 0 1 
CHN JPN 1 6 2004 1 2 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 11 2004 10 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 9 2005 7 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 9 2005 7 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 9 2005 7 3 1 0 
CHN USA 2 10 2006 7 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 12 2008 7 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 4 2010 7 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 5 2010 1 2 1 1 
CHN JPN 1 9 2010 16 4 1 0 
CHN ROK 1 12 2010 17 4 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 3 2011 10 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 3 2011 1 2 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 8 2011 12 3 1 0 
CHN JPN 1 11 2011 15 4 0 1 
CHN JPN 1 2 2012 13 4 1 0 
Table 4.   East China Sea after the End of the Cold War (Author’s own calculations 
from the events list, http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline).  
When we look at the level of actions in South and East China seas, in which 
China as the originator, we realize that, until 2010, the tension rose either in South China 
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Sea or East China Sea, but not simultaneously (Figure 6). While China had intensifying 
disputes in South China especially in 1996–99, 200–03, and 2006–09, East China Sea 
was comparatively tranquil, and the PLA engaged in serious confrontations with the 
Japanese forces in 2003–07. Regarding the level of hostilities, whereas China has 
resorted to the use of force more in South China Sea, it mostly displayed its forces in East 
China Sea. The PLA seems to have threatened Japan to use force more frequently than it 




Figure 5.  Comparative Level of Actions in South and East China Seas (Author’s own 
calculations from data in Table 3 and 4) 
 
 
Figure 6.  Comparative Level of Hostility in South and East China Seas (Author’s own 





















































a. South China Sea 
In the South China Sea particularly, China displayed a rising and falling 
pattern of assertiveness. Except for the years in 1997–99 and in most of the 2011, it 
showed belligerency above the average level of actions and hostility (Figures 8 and 9).  
 
 
Figure 7.  South China Sea Action Level China as Originator (Author’s own 
calculations from data in Table 3)  
 
 
Figure 8.  South China Sea Hostility Level China as Originator (Author’s own 
calculations from data in Table 3) 
As we see in the Figure 10, China threatened to use force in 11 percent 
and used force in 39 percent of the major incidents while displaying its force in 50 




























































Figure 9.  Ratios of the Hostility Types in South China Sea (Author’s own calculations 
from  data in Table3)   
More specifically, China confronted with Philippines and Vietnam more 
frequently than the other claimants, 17 and 6 out of 28 major MIDs respectively. PLA 
employed more assertive behaviors against Vietnam which is followed by the U.S. and 
Philippines. The single confrontation with Malaysia was an exception, whose Royal 
Navy patrol opened fire on Chinese fishing boats in Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone 
in March 16, 1995 (Figure 11).          
 
 
Figure 10.  The number of Incidents, the Average Action and Hostility Levels in South 




























b. East China Sea 
China’s assertiveness was below the average level of action and hostility 
most of the time in East China Sea except for occasional escalations in 2004 and in most 
of 2010 (Figure 12 and 13). China displayed its forces rather than using them in 68 
percent of the incidents while compared to 16 percent of threat to use of force and the use 
of force (Figure 14).   
 
 
Figure 11.  East China Sea Action Level, China as Originator (Author’s own 
calculations from data in Table 4)  
 
Figure 12.  East China Sea Hostility Level, China as Originator, (Author’s own 





























Figure 13.  Ratios of the Hostility Types in East China Sea (Author’s own calculations 
from data in Table 4) 
After analyzing these statistical data above, we need to look at some 
regional variables that affected China’s behaviors and may do so in the future as well. At 
the end of our evaluation, we will be able to reach three conclusions with respect to 
China’s international behavior. First, China’s realpolitik evaluations of the events and 
confrontational approaches continue and it has not changed its Cold War international 
behavior since. Second, China has been behaving in increasingly conciliatory manner and 
its assumed strategic culture is likely to be more influential than during the Cold War era. 
Third, China has not been behaving consistently, these approaches are conjectural and 
pragmatic, and it is therefore not possible to determine any one of the first and second 
conclusions. In order to understand the events and draw meaningful conclusions, we need 
to look at some regional factors which are likely to influence the China’s use of force 
decisions in South and East China Seas, such as alliances, institutions, increasing 











Ratio of the Hostility
Types in East China Sea
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III. INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY ALLIANCES 
The American security structure in Asia built in the Cold War has been the focus 
of events since the Cold War ended. Although the U.S. shield against the Soviet Union 
and Chinese expansionism have gone, Washington still retains its bilateral security 
treaties with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia, while, arguably, China and 
Russia challenge the U.S. dominance in the region. Moreover, as it is often asserted, the 
U.S. is polishing its relations with Japan, Philippines, and Australia to counter the rising 
China since its strategic pivot to Asia-Pacific region.53  Thus, the presence of the U.S. in 
the region still determines the level and the course of the actions and hostilities in East 
and South China Seas. Although it seems unlikely due to economic interdependence, 
multilateral or bilateral agreements, and burgeoning institutionalization, the prospect of a 
conflict between the rising continental (and increasingly maritime) power China and the 
maritime power the U.S. or other actors still exists.54  
 
 
Figure 14.  Institutions in East Asia (From Ernest Bower,2010, p.2). 
                                                 
53 Yong Wang, “Evolving Asian Power Balances and Alternate Conceptions for Building Regional 
Institutions,” Asian Development Bank (ADB) Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, no. 68 
(December 2010), 2–4.                                    
54 Woosang Kim, “Korea as a Middle Power in Northeast Asia,” in The United States and Northeast 
Asia, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 
123–124.                                     
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Fortunately, at least for now, confrontations continue between China and regional 
actors at the low- intensified levels with rare escalations. Therefore, regional political and 
diplomatic factors seem to deescalate the tension vis-à-vis great power antagonism which 
are likely to embitter it. Whereas ASEAN and plus versions serve as an important 
institutional framework and influence China’s behavior in the South China Sea, the 
absence of an institutional structure indigenous to Northeast Asia is the main 
characteristic of this sub-region. Despite this stark difference, some similar 
administrative, diplomatic, and bilateral relations have effects on China’s behavior in 
both regions.   
A. SOUTH CHINA SEA 
1. ASEAN- China Rapprochement 
Neo-realists argue that states may implement two types of balancing. First, they 
may practice “internal balancing” by improving their military capabilities. Second, they 
may resort to “external balancing” by revitalizing old alliances or establishing new ones. 
Besides these realpolitik calculations, institutions are increasingly playing important roles 
in Asian affairs. Southeast Asian countries have not balanced against the U.S. by allying 
with PRC or vice-versa. Instead, they accommodate China economically and militarily. 
There is little evidence to justify internal or external balancing behaviors of Philippines, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia, in spite of their historical, territorial, political disputes with 
China.55 Instead of military balancing, ASEAN initiated multilateral security dialogues 
and tried to constrain China’s behaviors by institutional norms and rules.56   
The 1997–98 financial crisis and China’s accession to WTO in 2001 brought 
China and ASEAN together. After its accession to WTO, China increased political and 
economic diplomacy to deepen the regional integration further and actively participated 
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at “ASEAN-led” East Asia integration.57 During the ASEAN+PRC summit in 2002, 
China signed four important agreements: the Declaration on Conduct in the South China 
Sea, the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Nontraditional Security Issues, 
the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, and the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation. One year later, at the 2003 
summit, the PRC “formally acceded” to ASEAN by signing Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, as the first non-ASEAN state. During the same summit they also signed the 
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, which had political, 
social, economic, and security content. Finally, they initiated the world’s largest free 
trade zone in 2010.58   
2. The Effects of ASEAN on China’s Use of Force Trend 
Shambaugh argues that PRC relations with ASEAN mean Beijing’s choice of 
multilateral relations and regional interests at the expense of limiting its sovereign 
interests. Moreover, by the signing of the Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea, 
ASEAN managed to engage a rising power by its own principles of non-aggression, non-
interference, non-use of force, and settling the disputes by peaceful meanings.59 When we 
look at the action and hostility levels of major confrontations in the region since China’s 
interaction with ASEAN, --in other words, the post-1997–98 financial crisis era which 
includes China’s accession to WTO in 2001 and to ASEAN in 2003-- we do not see any 
escalation, except for PLA’s live fire exercises around Spratly Islands and the Chinese 
vessels’ first appearance off the Scarborough Shoal in May 2001. In both cases, Beijing 
assured Philippines that it did not intend to increase its military presence in the area.60 
(Figure 16)  
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Figure 15.  South China Sea Action/Hostility Levels, China as Originator (Author’s 
own calculations from data in Table 3) 
3. China’s Other-than-Force Approaches 
a. Administrative Means 
China’s low posture also continued after the hey-day of the incipient 
institutional ties at the turn of the century. Since mid-2000, China has mostly used 
administrative means together with the civil maritime law enforcement agencies in the 
disputes.61 During the latest tension which began in 2007 and heightened in between 
2009 and 2011, China did not use naval forces actively. Instead, it utilized civilian 
maritime law enforcement agencies such as the State Oceanic Administration’s China 
Marine Surveillance force and the Ministry of Agriculture’s Fisheries Law Enforcement 
Command. For example, five Chinese vessels—a naval intelligence ship, a government 
fisheries patrol vessel, a state oceanographic patrol vessel, and two small fishing trawlers 
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Island in March 8, 2009, and the seized the illegal fishing boats by Chinese fishing 
management vessels in July 2010.62 Its goal was to prevent escalation while 
consolidating its claims.63  
b. Diplomatic Means 
China’s diplomatic efforts seem to be more impressive in recent years. 
Beijing explained its South China Sea stance in three documents submitted to U.N.: two 
notes verbale, in May 2009 and April 2011, and a preliminary declaration of claims to an 
extended continental shelf in May 2009. As Fravel and Swaine state, contrary to some 
comments, those documents do not imply any sign of escalation for a few reasons. First, 
they are not China’s unilateral actions, but the obligation of submitting its perspectives to 
the U.N. at a scheduled time. Second, except for the continental shelf issue, the 
arguments in the declarations are not new. On the contrary, they show the Chinese 
willingness to handle the issues on the common ground of international criteria, 
UNCLOS definitions, and according to the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in 
the South China Sea (DOC), signed between China and ASEAN in 2002.64 These 
declarations intend to force all claimants to solve the dispute according to international 
laws, by peaceful means, negotiations, consultations, but not the use of force. Another 
diplomatic document about South China Sea dispute is a joint statement between China 
and Vietnam signed in 2008. This document emphasized mutual understanding, good 
neighborhood relations, mutual trust, economic cooperation, information exchange 
between the militaries, and so on.65 As a result, China’s endeavors to solve the disputes 
are note-worthy.   
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4. The Reasons of Occasional Escalations  
a. Responses to Other Claimants 
PLA forces have not always been the originator of the incidents. China’s 
increasing fishing bans, patrols, exercises, and surveillance activities are only responses 
to the activities of the other claimants, especially since 2007. For example, China ordered 
patrol vessels to “demonstrate sovereignty” after the Philippine Congress passed an 
archipelagic baseline law in 2005. PLA increased its exercises in 2010 as a reaction to 
Vietnam’s initiatives for internationalizing the dispute to gain international support.66   
When we look at the actions and hostility levels of the MIDs of China-
Philippines and China-Vietnam dyads roughly between 2000 and 2010, which are 
China’s most frequent challengers, we see that China did not escalate tension with both 
of them simultaneously. As we see in the Figure 17, there was tranquility between China 
and Vietnam while the tension was high between China and Philippines roughly in the 
same period of time. The reason might be these two countries’ bilateral ties with the U.S. 
Although the United States withdrew its forces from Philippines in the early 1990s, it has 
been enhancing its security relations with Manila in recent years and it plans to increase 
military aid to its ally in coming years. Vietnam is also another country the United States 
seeks to strengthen bilateral relations especially since its strategic re-orientation to Asia- 
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Action and Hostility Levels between 
China and Philippines 
Action and Hostility Levels between 
China and Vietnam 
 
Figure 16.  Levels of Chinese Action and Hostility against Philippines and Vietnam 
(Author’s own calculations from data in Table 3) 
b. The United States Strategic Re-Orientation 
The other thing that could affect China’s behavior in two seas is the 
improving security ties of the other claimants with the U.S. If China perceives any 
increase in their assertiveness, it may react with coercive measures.67 As PRC strategic 
history suggests, China may resort to use of force if it perceives threats to its long-term 
security interests. As Christensen convincingly argues, China may use force, without any 
provocation, either to prevent the penetration of potential dangers through the opening 
window of vulnerability or to attain goals before closing window of opportunity.68 
Therefore, encouraged by its improving military capabilities and frustrated by the 
rapprochement between the U.S. and the regional countries, Chinese leaders may feel 
compelled to guarantee Beijing’s long-term political and security interests.69 
 Besides the provocations of regional countries, the U.S. strategic 
approach to the region may also escalate the tension in the disputes. Michael Auslin’s 
“Concentric Triangles” type of strategies may further alienate China in the region. The 
strategy includes two triangles that share “common concerns.” The outer triangle links 
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Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia while the inner triangle includes Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. The countries in the big triangle have political 
stability, economic strength, and military capability. Therefore, the report suggests that 
the U.S. may enhance its military cooperation with those countries. They should first 
respond the threat in their immediate areas and then call for the others to come in 
following phases of the escalation. On the other hand, the countries in the smaller triangle 
need the U.S. assistance from many perspectives. For example, the strategic locations of 
Vietnam and Malaysia dictate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
support. Besides these individual relationships with each triangle, the United States 
should promote economic partnerships and exchanges among all of them on the ground 
of common regional norms, behaviors, and coordination.70   
c. Revisiting Realpolitik Calculations 
In that case, institutions may become irrelevant and ineffective in the 
Chinese thinking.71 As Yong Wang argues, ASEAN’s regional role should be evaluated 
within the realpolitik security structure of the region at this point.72 The occupation of 
Mischief Reef in late 1994 may serve as a good example of this perspective. As many 
scholars believe, China’s desires to compete with the U.S. and to increase its strategic 
influence in the Western Pacific led to the occupation in 1994. Besides that, China may 
have wanted to have a strategic negotiation power vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan who are 
believed to counterbalance China’s growth by ASEAN.73 Furthermore, China may have 
occupied the reef to test the U.S. and ASEAN’s reaction and the U.S. willingness to 
foster “pro-western security structure” in newly beginning post-Cold War era.74 Although 
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some rejects the idea that the occupation of Mischief Reef was another step of the 
Chinese naval hegemony in South China Sea, some others interpret this event as China’s 
ambition to regain its lost status in the region.75 Moreover, some argues that it is the 
Chinese first step to become a global maritime power.76 In any case, the occupation is 
also a good example from Christensen’s window logic perspective because, undeniably, 
the U.S. withdrawal from Philippines in 1992 provided China with a great opportunity to 
seize the reefs. In sum, the U.S. position and way of approach to the challenges may 
instigate realist reactions from China. 
5. Realities Outweigh Possibilities in Favor Conciliation  
While the seizure of Mischief Reef seems to be an example of the continuation of 
China’s past “window of opportunity” approach in territorial disputes, Beijing’s 
conciliatory international behavior gained momentum after the Taiwan-strait crisis in 
1995–96. Since the mid-1990s, although China delays the resolution to the disputes and 
strengthens its position, it aims to prevent the escalation at the same time.77 The PRC’s 
main goal is to consolidate its claims and deter others’ claims by bilateral talks rather 
than multilateral negotiations on the base of ASEAN.78  Since then, three major events 
seem to have determined China’s use of force attitudes in South China Sea until 2007: the 
1997–98 financial crisis, China’s accession to WTO in 2001, and the elaboration of 
ASEAN-China relations. Thanks to the treaties and agreements of ASEAN, China 
behaved in decorum in most of the confrontations and contented itself with diplomatic 
and administrative measures. Contrary to its relatively amicable posture in the first half of 
the decade, Beijing reacted in forceful ways against the other claimants especially after 
2007. Philippines and Vietnam remained as main contenders in the region. Admittedly, 
the U.S. strategic re-orientation toward Asia and its enhancing security relationships with 
the regional countries are likely to irritate Beijing further in coming years. But if 
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Washington incorporates Beijing into the structures further, it may repel Chinese 
antagonism. For now, China’s behavior in South China is pragmatic with respect to the 
region’s political situation. As Jiang Zemin announced in 2002, the first two decades of 
21st century became the period of “strategic opportunity” for China. China will have to 
wait until an escalated confrontation becomes less costly than present. 
B. EAST CHINA SEA 
1. Regional Relations 
As is frequently seen, the rise of China and territorial conflicts inevitably co-exist 
in Northeast Asia. Nationalism nourishing from historical hatreds and the perception of 
sovereignty feed the assertiveness of China and Japan. According to realist international 
relations theories, the United States may be expected to enhance its existing ties with 
Japan and South Korea while seeking to  create a “net” consisting of countries from 
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and even from  the Middle East to balance the 
rising China.79 The trilateral dialogue between the U.S., Japan, and India and the 
expansion of Pacific partnership with Australia to Indo-Pacific region are the recent 
American initiatives perceived by China as a kind of containment policy. However, as we 
see in the Figure 18, the level of hostility in East China Sea since beginning of 2011 did 
not decrease contrary to the U.S. strategic re-orientation to Asia and enhancing its 
political and diplomatic presence. Therefore, PRC seems to voice its claims at louder 
levels to assure itself that everybody lined against it hears them.   
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Figure 17.  East China Sea Hostility Level, China as Originator, (Author’s own 
calculations from data in Table 4) 
The U.S. ongoing security treaties with Japan and South Korea have been the 
source of anxiety for China for decades. Furthermore, The United States- Japan-South 
Korea trilateral relations are believed to be increasingly important in the region, but 
South Korea’s influence in East China disputes has not been as critical as it was 
surmised. China seems to have weakened this coalition by utilizing its growing economic 
relation with South Korea. Therefore, among the regional bilateral relations, the United 
States-Japan alliance has always been crucially important with respect to China’s 
behavior in East China Sea and likely to remain so.  
2. Limiting Factors on China’s Assertiveness 
a. The United States-Japan Alliance 
Japanese leaders discuss whether to continue “entanglement” or to adopt 
“abandonment” strategy with respect to its relations with the U.S. Depending on its 
domestic political situation; Japan may behave in nationalist, patriotic, self-strengthening, 
and pro-alliance or UN-oriented and pacifist manners.80 In any case, Japan may increase 
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the process toward being a “normal state” by revising its constitution (Article 9) and 
upgrading the Self Defense Forces (SDF), which will ultimately encourage Japan to 
participate to the disputes in the region and use of force when it is necessary. 
Furthermore, if Japan realizes any insufficiency in the American protection against 
DPRK and China, Tokyo is believed to instigate a conventional and nuclear arms race 
across Asia, which could result in accelerating the regional militarization and this 
outcome will be contrary to the U.S. interests.81 Aside from these possibilities, the 
current U.S. presence undeniably influences Chinese behavior in East China Sea. As 
Fravel argues, this alliance has deterred China from using coercive measures to take the 
control of Senkaku Islands. Obviously, Washington’s emphases on the Article V of the 
1960 Mutual Security Treaty and the repetition of the Japanese administration on the 
islands during the rising tensions in 2004 and 2009 caused China to decrease its 
assertiveness.82 
b. Regional and Global Opinion 
“The trend of time” and global opinion are also other constraints on states’ 
behaviors. They may urge states to find rapid solutions to the problems and not to use 
force in the first place.83 China is one of these states and it does not want to endanger its 
“peaceful rise” image. This concern is also effective on China’s “deterring strategy” in 
Senkaku Islands. As Fravel argues, Beijing does not want to be the “aggressor” side of 
the confrontation and endanger its “peaceful development.”84 As it is argued with respect 
to Taiwan issue, we can also say that China would both debilitate the credibility of its 
own strive for de-militarized international politics and endanger its “great power rise” if 
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it behaved otherwise. In other words, the use of force may endanger China’s economic 
and social relations with the regional countries and accelerate the “normalization” of 
Japan.85    
c. Mutual Relations 
China and Japan also have tried to decrease the tension by administrative 
and political initiatives. As a result of these policies, as we see in the Figure 19, there was 
relative calm in East China Sea between 2004 and 2010. For example they agreed on 
joint development of resources in East China Sea in 2008. Previously, China had 
forbidden the activists to go Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2004.86 During the Jiang Zemin’s 
visit to Japan in 1998, Chinese leaders realized the disastrous results of their emphasis on 
historical issues. Following the Premier Zhu Rongji’s trip to Japan 2000, China tried to 
improve its relations either by increasing bilateral interactions with Japan or through 
multilateral and institutional forums like ASEAN+3 and Northeast Asia Cooperation 
Dialogue.87 As we see in the figure, the level of militarized actions was at the lowest 
points roughly between 2000 and 2004.    
 
 
Figure 18.  East China Sea Action Level, China as Originator, (Author’s own 
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calculations from data in Table 4) 
3. Display of Force Rather than Use of It 
The threshold of using force in East Asia has been higher than in South China 
Sea. When we compare the ratios of the hostility types in South and East China seas, 
China seems to be mostly inclined to display of force in both waters. Besides, its 
tendency to use force in South China Sea is almost two times greater than the one in East 
China Sea. However, the ratio of displaying force in both seas is much higher than the 
percentage in territorial disputes since 1949. On the other side, the ratios of use for force 
in both East and South China seas are lower than the previous decades. Admittedly, the 
U.S. perennial security commitments to Japan and South Korea were the main deterrence 
for China. Besides that, Japan’s “normalization” will likely to further discourage China 
from using force (See Figure 20 and 21). Ironically, the U.S. commitment to the region 
delayed the Japanese initiatives to have their own military forces and China was able to 
assert itself more comfortably in this status-quo. Therefore, the U.S. military presence has 
not been so frightening for the Chinese because it seems to have managed to trade-off 
this vulnerability by being the biggest debt holder of the U.S. However, the U.S. strategic 
re-orientation to the region may not only increase its political, economic, and military 
presence but also accelerate Japan’s normalization. As a result, China may face with a 
stronger alliance which will certainly raise the threshold of using force, but this threshold 
may also drop very fast considering the Chinese use of force behaviors in the past. Until 







Figure 19.  Ratios of Hostility Types in South and East China Seas (Author’s own 
calculations from data in Tables 3 and 4) 
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IV. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND ENERGY 
RELATIONS 
A. ECONOMY  
In the 21st century, the diplomatic, economic, and security relations became more 
interdependent than in the past. Economic prosperity strongly depends on favorable 
diplomatic relations and economic concerns are one of the crucial parts of foreign policy 
considerations.88 Countries have become much more worried about the adverse effects of 
a war on their economic development. Regarding China, the effects of the interdependent 
economic relations have required PRC to display more benign international behaviors. 
Although the 2008–09 financial crisis seems to be an opportunity for the Chinese to 
achieve their goals, Beijing has not exploited the vulnerability of the other claimants by 
using force, but rather has leveraged its economic importance for them. Its post-crisis 
assertiveness and trends in economic relations prove the reality of this assessment.      
1. The Interdependency: A Deterrent  
Interdependency theorists argue that increasing bilateral and multilateral 
economic relations, as an outcome of globalization, deter states from behaving 
irresponsibly and risking their gains. Because China’s economy heavily relies on foreign 
trade, international markets, investment, and imported energy resources, it is believed 
that as long as China engages with the international economy and its institutions, 
Beijing’s supposed belligerent “conflict behaviors” may transform into more conciliatory 
relationships.89 The Figure 22 and 23 depict the ever-increasing trajectory of the trade 
between PRC and East Asian countries from the end of the Cold War until 2008 financial 
crisis. 
When we compare the levels of militarized actions and hostility in East and South 
China Seas with the PRC’s increasing trade relations with East Asian countries and 
                                                 
88 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (November 2011), October 13, 2011. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.    
89 Burles and Shulsky, Patterns in China’s use of Force, 31–32; Johnston, “China’s Militarized 
Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992,” 2.                                               
 42 
China-ASEAN 5, we can conclude that the incidents in the troubled waters were not so 
intense as to adversely affect bilateral trade (see Figure 24). A professor at the PLA 
University of National Defense argues that the sides may seem adamant about 
concessions in the territorial disputes and use their all national strength, especially the 
military forces as a last choice, to accomplish their goals. However, different from the 
history, war is unlikely in the Asia-Pacific due to global economic integration. Therefore, 
the countries constrain their behaviors in order not to harm the economic benefits and as 
a result of this consideration, conflicts continue only at low-intensified levels. Even if 




Figure 21.  PRC’s Manufacturing Trade with East Asian Countries, 1992–2007 
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Figure 22.  Trade between China and ASEAN-5 (From Devadason, 2010, p. 657). 
       
 
Figure 23.  The Trend of Hostility and Action in South and East China Seas (Author’s 









































2. Financial Crisis: Opportunity or Legitimacy? 
On the other hand, as it is clear in the Figure 25, the trend of hostility in South and 
East China Seas—in other words, China’s assertiveness—increased after the 2008 
financial crisis. Some scholars argue that China may take the advantage of the U.S. 
vulnerability to keep China on the field to be able to weather the economic crisis.91 The 
United States has huge economic interests in Asia, whose dynamic economic nature and 
open markets are crucial for U.S. export, investment, trade, and access to technology. 
Given the global financial crisis and economic difficulties, it is essential for Washington 
to open new markets for American business firms and to keep the sea lanes free and 
secure for commerce and navigation in the South China Sea from where half the world’s 
merchant tonnage flows.92 This chance is also crucial given the fact that the largest U.S. 
bilateral trade deficits are with two Asian countries—China and Japan. Therefore, in line 
with Thomas J. Christensen’s “windows of opportunity” logic, during the post-financial 
crisis period, PRC leaders could have wanted to take advantage of the American’s 
predicament economic conditions before closing of the “window opportunity.” However, 
as Fravel points out, China would have also profited from the U.S. engagement with the 
Middle East since 2003 Iraq War to increase its belligerency, but it did not.93 Therefore, 
Kai He’s legitimate-prospect explanations seem to be more persuasive than the window 
approach. As we see in the figure below, China itself was in the “domain of losses” 
during the financial crisis although Beijing was more successful at weathering the crisis 
than the U.S. and the European Union (EU). 
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Figure 24.  Growth of Merchandise Trade: East Asia, Developing East Asia, and 
ASEAN, January 2008–July 2009 (Y-O-Y, percent) (From Athukorala, 
2010, p. 62). 
The Chinese government’s main source of legitimacy has been the economic 
growth for decades. Therefore, the economic gains or losses, in other words, the 
legitimacy of the PRC leaders, may help us understand China’s crisis management 
attitudes and its subsequent behaviors. In accordance with Kai He’s legitimate-prospect 
model, as long as China maintain its economic growth and sustain its domestic 
legitimacy, PRC leaders may not want to endanger their gains by taking risky decisions 
in crises. Conversely, if it feels a decrease in the gains and exacerbation in the losses, 
Beijing may take more coercive and riskier diplomatic and military measures to reverse 
the decline. Besides that, according to the theory, international pressure plays as an 
important determiner on China’s behavior in a crisis. High international pressure during a 
severe confrontation increases the possibility of risky and coercive measures while more 
favorable environment during a milder conflict does not stimulate China to act 
belligerently. Therefore, the mutual economic gains seem to have kept the tension at low 
levels, but any potential damage to them may escalate the tension at any time.94   
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3. Post-Crisis Period: Increasing Assertiveness  
After the 2008 financial crisis, FDI inflows and outflows started to increase, as we 
see in the Figure 26. East and Northeast Asia’s FDI inflows grew by 17 percent while 
Southeast Asia’s one 109 percent.95 Japan became the main investor in ASEAN region, 
which was followed by Singapore, China, and Hong Kong.96 On the other side, FDI 
outflow also increased even if not so dramatic as the inflow did. Although it was still 10 
percent below pre-crisis average level of 2005–2007 and 40 percent below the highest 
number in 2007, it grew 13 percent in 2010 with respect to 2008 and 2009.97 Considering 
the fact that the tensions also increased both in East and South China Seas after the crisis, 
we can conclude that countries did not allow territorial disputes to weaken their trade 
relations. They tried to keep economic activities insulated from militarized actions which 
might have derived even from the personal discretionary decisions of the low-level 
military or administrative officers. Even if we think that China’s recent belligerent 
military policies may weaken its free trade and economic development, it must be kept in 
mind that the senior officials take decisions after comparing the harms the crisis may 
cause and the desired outcome at the end of the confrontation.98 This outcome seems to 
reflect the Chinese exploitation of the other claimants’ increasing economic relations 
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Foreign direct investment inflows by sub-region,  
                                 2008–2010  
 





Figure 25.  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Outflows in 2008–10 (From Asia-
Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2011, pp. 32 and 39). 
4. Regional Response to China’s Post-Crisis Beligerency 
Regional economic and commercial responses to China’s increasing assertiveness 
have been not so negative. As we see in the Table 5 and the Figure 27, China’s export 
and import shares increased from 2008 to 2010 in Asia-Pacific region in addition to the 
FDI inflow growth  from 2009 to 2010. On the other hand,  the importance of the 
countries’ territorial claims continued to play an important role in decision-makers’ 
calculations. Eventually, it seems that they will neither let the confrontations undermine 
economic relations nor the bilateral trades and investment soften their nationalistic 
sovereignyty claims. We can anticipate that as long as their mutual commercial and 
financial relations grow, so does the threshold of resorting to coercive measures in the 
confrontations. Therefore, from a pragmatic perspective, China is not likely to escalate 
the conflicts to a point where the confrontation may stymie economic relations while 
being determined to exploit the other claimants’ dependence on its commercial and 
financial ties at the same time. China seems to implement the first part of this logic 
against Japan in East China Sea and the second part vis-à-vis the other claimants in South 




Destination markets of Asia-Pacific exports 
(in percentage share and percentage points) 
Origins of Asia-Pacific imports 













AP 2000 43.0 10.6 4.9 27.5 51.2 14.7 11.9 24.6 




4.1 -2.0 3.0 3.2 1.0 -2.4 1.8 1.6 
AP 2010 49.5 8.1 9.8 31.7 53.3 10.5 14.1 28.2 
Table 5.   Destination Markets of Exports and Origins of Imports (From Asia-Pacific 




Figure 26.  Foreign direct investment inflows to the regional “giants” in 2008–2010 
(From Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2011, p. 33). 
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5. Bilateral China-Japan Relations 
As Susan Shirk states, Northeast and Southeast Asian countries worry about a 
possible confrontation between the two regional powers—China and Japan-- which hold 
more than 80 percent of the total economies of the thirteen East and Southeast Asian 
countries.99 This mutual economic interdependence plays an important role in China’s 
policies toward Japan. Japan is one of the largest trading partners and sources of foreign 
direct investment. Arguably, the economic costs of hostile relations with Japan dissuade 
the Chinese government from furthering controversial issues.100 Although Yinan He 
opposes the idea that economic interdependence can outweigh anti-Japanese nationalism, 
it is a fact that China minimized its historical assertions after realizing its adverse effects 
on the relations and tried to improve economic and political relations, as it was 
mentioned in the previous chapter.101 
As the Figure 28 shows, the FDI from Japan to China seems small in the total 
FDI, but it grows and surpasses the U.S. shares. Japanese manufacturers prefer to base in 
China rather than the other parts of Asia.102 However, different from the case in South 
China Sea with ASEAN members, China-Japan confrontation does not seem to be 
insulated from the bilateral economic relations. The Japanese FDI started to increase after 
dipping in 1999 throughout the first half of the decade during which the tension between 
China and Japan was at the lower levels. China’s two-sided approach, as described above, 
can explain this difference between East and South China Seas. While China is 
deescalating the tension in East China Sea to protect the economic gains, it is not 
refraining from intensifying the tension in South China Sea to exploit the adversaries’ 
dependence on economic relations with China.   
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Figure 27.  Foreign Direct Investment to the People’s Republic of China (From Kim 
and et al., 2009, p. 27). 
Economic regionalization and security order are the future of Asia rather than 
power struggle and competition.103 China-Japan economic interdependence prevented 
them from increasing hostility and limited the competition.104 The tension between these 
two economic partners was not beneficial for them, so they have resumed high-level 
bilateral relations after 2010 incident. China benefits from the Japanese technology and 
investment while Japan continues its economic growth thanks to China’s leading 
performance. Inter-governmental and non-governmental relations have also improved. 
The two financial crises also brought them closer to weather them. For example, these 
two and other Asian countries had instigated a currency swap program of “Chiang Mai 
Initiative” after the 1997–98 financial crisis. These and other kinds of initiatives 
decreased competition even if not totally eradicated it. While it is difficult to reconcile 
these two regional powers, their relations will likely determine the economic future of 
East Asia.105 In spite of occasional escalation, displaying force instead of using it may 
serve as a “mutually-assured-destruction” role in economic terms.    
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B. ENERGY 
Increasing energy demand has determined China energy security policies. In order 
to meet this demand, Beijing has tried to diversify the suppliers by making purchase 
agreements with the foreign oil producers. As of 2002, China ordered its oil companies to 
“go out” and invest internationally.106 At the same time, the energy security has 
increasingly become related to foreign policies and international cooperation in recent 
years.107 Therefore, China’s need to secure energy supply lanes, especially through South 
China Sea, its energy exploration activities in East and South China seas, and the 
exclusively possession of large amount of heavy rare earth elements (HREE) in south 
China are likely to increase PRC’s belligerency. On the other hand, if its efforts to 
diversify energy supplies by utilizing unconventional resources give fruit and it increases 
the share of non-fossil fuel energy in its total energy consumption, we can expect 
decrease in its assertiveness. 
1. Reasons that may Stimulate Assertiveness 
a. High Energy Demands and Securing Supply Lanes in South 
China Sea 
China has a huge energy demand compared to even the big powers of the 
region. China’s industry-driven energy demand surpassed four times than predicted and 
its share in the global energy demand increased from 10 percent in 2001 to 15 percent in 
2006. The Chinese industry constituted 48 percent of its GDP in 2005 while the amounts 
were 20 percent in the U.S. and 27 percent in India. Thus, its energy intensity is four 
times greater than the U.S. and eight times greater than Japan. Together with the coal, 
which meets its 67 percent of all energy needs, oil has been another crucial energy 
resource. Although China was the fourth largest oil producer outside the Middle East and 
one of the exporters until 1993, it had to import half of its oil needs in 2006 and will 
continue to import 60–80 percent of its needs in 2020 according to the estimations. 
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Additionally, 43 percent of the world oil demand and 66 percent of the world coal 




Figure 28.  Energy Demand Forecast (From Busby, 2009, p. 26). 
 China’s economic development required military forces to protect 
expanding economic interests and resource supply lines which were established to meet 
this high demand. Protecting energy import routes has become critical for sustaining 
economic development besides other maritime interests. Obviously, China has linked 
economic welfare with national security by Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) 
operations. However, China’s diversification efforts of oil sources do not necessarily 
decrease the vulnerability of the transportation through the Strait of Hormuz and the 
Strait of Malacca. In other words, Middle East or Africa does not make any difference as 
long as China still needs to import oil through those chock points. What makes different 
is importing from Asia-Pacific region which has only 3percent share in the total oil 
import.109 Otherwise, needless to say, China will remain preoccupied with the security of 
these straits and have another reason to sustain its claims on the islands. For example, 
according to some scholars, one of the reasons behind China’s Mischief Reef initiative 
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was trying to influence the sea lanes of communication in the region.110 Furthermore, the 
economic motivations were more important than military calculations and strategic 
concerns. They interpret the seizure as the result of China’s “economic pragmatism.”111 
At this point, China’s energy relations with Central Asia, in the context of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), are note-worthy because it shows how China can 
secure its energy supply routes without having to resort to military force.  
The SCO has not only influenced the balance of power in Central Asia but 
also directly affected Caspian Sea Base (CSB) resources.112 SCO connects natural gas 
reserves like Russia and Iran with other Central Asian states.113 Thus, as the world’s 
second biggest oil importer and consumer of natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
China strongly needs SCO’s cooperation over CSB energy sources to achieve a 
sustainable economic growth.114 Indeed, it was one of the main driving factors behind the 
establishment of SCO. China was not only trying to stabilize the region but also trying to 
improve energy transportation alternatives. At the end, SCO has facilitated China’s 
interaction with the countries and enabled it to benefit from CSB energy resources. For 
example China National Petroleum Corporation was able to get of the 60 percent of the 
Kazakh oil firm Aktobemunaigaz in 2003, make an agreement to construct an oil pipeline 
from western Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, and attain onshore concession in Turkmenistan in 
2006.115 It seems that China has obtained what it hoped from the establishment of the 
organization and eventually, this interdependence between the member states both 
improved the relations and eradicated any kind of military conflict.    
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b. The Importance of East and South China Seas  
China projects power in East and South China seas which are believed to 
have rich energy resources. These offshore reserves constitute 15 percent of the Chinese 
oil production. Recently, the exploration and production (E&P) efforts have increasingly 
concentrated on Pearl River Mouth Basin in South China Sea and some areas in East 
China Sea, but to a lesser extent. In 2011, CNOOC discovered some oil fields in addition 
to the already-known rich gas reserves in Enping Trough and Liuhua regions of the Pearl 
River Mouth Basin.116 Among other islands, Spratlys, one of the four main island groups 
in South China Sea, maybe the most important one. It is on the lines of commercial ships 
from Indian to Pacific Ocean and crude oil tankers from Persian Gulf to Asia. It has 
estimated 105 or 213 billion barrels oil reserves and from 266 to 2000 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) gas reserves. It is also one of the richest fishing grounds in the world.117 As a result, 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines clash over the region. 
Conversely, Zha and Valencia point out that South China Sea is not China’s major source 
of energy.118 But, in any case, islands in South China Sea remain as the focal points.    
c. The Rare Earth Elements in South China 
Heavy rare earth elements (HREE) management seems to be another 
candidate to cause tension between China and other countries which are dependent on 
these resources. South China is very rich of HREEs such as dysprosium, terbium, and 
yttrium. Having 95 or 97 percent of HREE reserves, which can be used in everything that 
has motor and battery technology, China may implement “resource coercion” against 
Japan and the U.S. If China cuts HREE supply, the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan suffer both 
economically and militarily. Furthermore, Shane Bilsborough argues that if this coercive 
energy policy compounds with China’s strategic culture which is highly realist contrary 
to the Chinese arguments, then, security dilemma may emerge in the energy field.119 
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However, China may want to benefit from its comparative advantage economically 
before escalating the tension and militarizing the issue. This probability of any 
confrontation bases on the assumptions and China has not displayed any hostility coming 
from this advantage. Although Bilsborough expects a confrontation between China and 
others over HREE management by referring to the Chinese strategic culture, the 
economic and energy interdependence may overcome those fears and commercial 
priorities may raise the threshold of using these elements as a weapon.     
2. Initiatives that may Abate Tensions 
a. The Advent of Unconventional Resources 
Unconventional resources will decrease China’s dependence on oil and 
gas imports as well as military build-up to secure the energy supply lanes. China’s shale 
gas reserves will require China to import more natural gas than the oil. Chinese national 
oil companies (NOCs) will “go abroad” either to learn the technology for the shale gas 
development or to invest in open markets like the U.S. and Canada rather than trying to 
make deal with the Middle Eastern or Latin American petro-states. It has already invested 
U.S. $16 billion in Canada’s unconventional oil sands in 2010 and 2011. China is going 
to not only diversify its energy supply but also decrease its dependence on Strait of 
Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca by the advent of the unconventional energy because 
Canada will be able to supply China directly through East China Sea. In that case, it may 
not need to improve its naval capabilities to secure these strategic points, which worries 
the regional countries.120 In the end, by the increasing usage of this energy, China may 
not need to patrol the straits or create “string of pearls” for energy security 
considerations. Despite the fact that the unconventional energy does not have as big share 
as the conventional energy resources, the trajectory seems to favor softening future 
conflicts and increasing interdependence in more acceptable ways than China’s current 
vulnerabilities to long distances.      
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b. Increasing the Share of Renewable Energy Resources while 
Decreasing the Others 
China has decided to increase the shares of hydroelectric sources, natural 
gas, nuclear power, and other renewable energy by 2015. Beijing targets to raise the non-
fossil fuel energy consumption to 11.4 percent in 12th Five Year Plan. By the way, 
Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates the share of coal to fall to 59% by 2035.121 
Even before this plan, China had invested RMB 5–10 billion (about $700 million–$1.4 
billion) 50 percent of which on R&D in its 11th Five Year Plan, between 2006 and 2010. 
Furthermore, the amount of the investment is expected to be RMB 5.4 trillion 
($800 billion) between 2009 and 2020.122 The Figure 30 shows the shares of the each 
renewable energy types in green power investment. Although the planned nuclear plants 
are estimated to meet only 4 percent of China’s electricity needs in 2030, it has the third 
largest allocation in the investment.123 As in the unconventional energy case, the 
renewable energy resources are not sufficient enough to replace the fossil fuel energy 
consumption for now (see Figure 30). However, the more China produces its energy 
needs through renewable process, the less it depends on oil import and so on naval 
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Global and China’s Primary Energy Consumption Green power investment: 
Total 2009–20 
(5.4 trillion RMB) 
 
  
Source: (From Jian, 2011, p.31). Source: (From Nesbitt and et al., 2012, 
p.31). 
 
Figure 29.  Shares of Energy Types in China’s Total Consumption and its Investement 
on Renewable Ebergy Resources  
Although China’s current energy needs and supply policies require a strong 
military presence along the lanes of transportation and around the specific resource-rich 
valuable areas, improvements in alternative energy resources will likely to lower the 
tension. It is difficult to argue that these secondary resources will adequately meet 
China’s energy needs, but they may increasingly satisfy China’s energy appetite and 
decrease its heavy dependence on traditional resources. In the end, PRC will not have to 
build-up its military presence to protect supply lanes and, ultimately, this new level of 
necessity will decrease PLA’s assertiveness in the region. The growing portion of 
renewable energy in its total energy consumption will lead to China’s lowering level of 
use of force against the claimants in the South and East China Seas and the intruders on 
the way of the transportation lines. 
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V. MILITARY BALANCE AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Asia is the most militarized and nuclearized continent in the world 
(see Figure 31). Emerging powers like China and India have been modernizing their 
militaries and Japan has been discussing becoming “normal state” by which it may be 
able to employ its own military prowess. The United States has security treaties with 
Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia. Besides that, the trilateral dialogues 
between the U.S., Japan, and India and the expansion of pacific partnership with 
Australia and Indo-Pacific have been enhanced. Under these circumstances, China seems 
to feel itself less secure and therefore needs to improve its military capabilities. 
Therefore, whether militarized disputes escalate into a war or not will likely to depend on 
China’s modernization efforts, the reactions of the U.S. and regional countries to the 
China’s procurement activities, and the eventual security context.  
 
 







A. MILITARY BALANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA’S USE 
OF FORCE POLICY 
1. China’s Improving Military Capabilities and Deficiencies 
China’s military developments accelerated in late 1990s and in the first decade of 
the twenty first century during which the United States was dealing with terrorism in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East. It is commonly accepted that China primarily focused 
on curbing the influence of the U.S. and the other regional powers’ both quantitatively 
and qualitatively in the region.124 It has sought an “intimidating” military capacity to 
change the balance of power, to retain powerful naval forces equal to its growing national 
power, to meet the country’s growing trade and resource needs, to cover the distance in 
which it has territorial claims (first and second island chains), and to deter the U.S. 
surveillance activities and other nations’ claims on the islands.125 In other words, China’s 
growing international stature has stimulated it to develop its military capabilities. This 
ambition reveals itself in many of its procurement and modernization efforts: its 
investments in the nuclear-powered submarines, the aircraft carrier, new missile units, 
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C), the aerial-refueling programs, advanced 
destroyers and submarines, and improvements in space-based C4ISR systems and over-
the-horizon sensors. Additionally, the location of Sanya base and Jin-class ballistic 
missiles deployment on it, and the size of the amphibious ships are also the indications of 
China’s overseas orientation.126  
 The PLA has been improving certain capabilities that could affect the military 
balance in favor of PRC, but they also have some deficiencies. For example, PLAN is 
trying to increase the number of its Jin-class ballistic missile submarines from three to 
five or six, which are capable of reaching the west coast of the U.S. It also plans to have 
between three to six aircraft carriers to be able to fulfill the “Far Sea Defense” missions 
beyond the home waters. However, the PLAN is still far behind the U.S. Navy 
capabilities both qualitatively and operationally. The Chinese Shang-class submarines are 
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modern, but not capable in an antisubmarine warfare against the United States and Japan. 
Besides its naval forces, China is also improving its air force capabilities with the next 
generation of J-10 fighters, fifth generation twin-engine J-13 and J-14 stealth fighters, 
advanced fourth generation Su-35, and Su 30MKK multirole fighters. These weapons 
enable PLAAF to cover the Japanese home island, most of the Indochina, and northern 
part of the Southeast Asia. By aerial refueling and ground-control capabilities, PLAAF 
will be able to control South China Sea shipping lanes. Regarding its missile forces under 
the 2nd Artillery Corps, the PLA is capable of reaching northern parts of South China 
Sea, Japan, Philippines, and Southeast Asia, excluding Indonesia. Moreover, its long-
range ballistic missiles can cover great amount of land masses, including the west coast 
of the U.S. China is also trying to support this hard forces by its cyber and asymmetric 
capabilities in the “local war under informationized conditions.”127 Additionally, its 
ambitions in the space and the progress it has achieved for two decades indicate that 
China is likely to utilize the other dimensions of the warfare successfully as well. These 
asymmetric capabilities will likely to compensate the deficiencies of the conventional 
forces vis-à-vis the U.S. or the other regional actors.  
 
 
Table 6.   Range of the Balistic Missiles (From Busby, 2009, p. 62). 
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2. Regional Reactions 
The regional responses have become extremely important against China’s military 
build-up. The rise of China has been a “convenient excuse” for India, Japan, and even for 
the U.S. to enhance their military capabilities.128 Japan maintains its antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) capabilities and wants to replace its F-4s, F-15s, and F-2s with next 
generation stealth fighters. It also seeks to improve its ballistic missile defense 
capabilities against China’s long-range missiles. Although it is behind PLA capabilities, 
India is believed to be the main country that would balance China. In addition to the 
existing submarines, missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fighters, and aircrafts, India 
develops fifth generation stealth fighters and ground-attack aircraft with Russia. 
Regarding the Southeast Asian countries, they do not have any military forces capable 
enough to counterbalance China. Therefore, the United States remains the real balancer 
and the provider of the stability in Indo-Pacific. Congruent with its strategic reorientation 
toward Asia, the United States seeks to fortify its presence in the region by superior and 
forward-based military forces.129 The U.S. Marines arrived in Darwin, Australia, and has 
carried out joint exercises with Philippines. Secretary of Defense states that “60 percent 
of the U.S. fleet would be deployed in the Pacific by 2020.130      
In fact, increasing Chinese activism and presence in the East and South China 
Seas are the natural outcome of its growing capabilities, but it is not unique to China. As 
we see in the Table 7, when we look at the active duty and military personal numbers, 
China has the most populous armed forces. The number of equipment and weapons in 
ground, air, and naval forces, together with missiles and satellites, are modest compared 
to the U.S. military forces in the region and not overwhelmingly greater than the military 
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presence of India and Japan.131 However, the PLA’s capabilities still worry its neighbors 
and increase the perception of China’s assertiveness, and fear of Beijing’s use of force to 
settle the issues.132   
 
Armed forces (th)  Rank  
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956  -90  1  5  
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Korea  
750  683  655  0  7  6  
Pakistan  550  612  642  25  8  7  
Vietnam  1,05
2  
484  482  27  6  8  
Myanmar  230  344  406  0  13  9  
Thailand  283  301  306  0  10  10  
Indonesia  283  297  302  0  10  11  
Taiwan  370  370  290  0  9  12  
Japan  249  237  248  0  12  13  
Sri Lanka  65  –  161  0  14  14  
Banglades
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-1,969  N/A  N/A  
Table 7.   Armed Forces and the Number of ICBMs in Asia (Table available at 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/SA12_Bythenumbers.pdf) 
3. Implications for Use of Force Policy 
a. Prospect of the Further Militarization of the Disputes 
As a result of China’s expanding national interests, increasing security 
needs, and growing military capabilities, it is widely believed that PRC leaders may 
reveal assertive behaviors after they feel confident about their military power.133 If China 
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Number of ICBMs 
 1990 1995 2000 2012 
United 
States 1,000 580 550 450 
Russia 1,398 930 776 292 
China 8 17+ 20+ 66 
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continues to success in its modernization efforts, Beijing is expected to prioritize military 
options in solving the problems in the region. Besides, the PLA’s expanding new 
missions are interpreted as indications of China’s abandonment of Deng Xiaoping’s “low 
profile” and “biding-time” approach and its increasing demands on the international 
system.134 Apparently, successfully modernized military forces would mean more 
capable and intimidating PLA in the confrontations with the regional powers or the U.S. 
Additionally, the lack of transparency about its actual capabilities and defense 
expenditures increases the concerns with respect to China’s real intentions, behavior in 
the disputes, and its ultimate goals. 
Moreover, China’s transforming military strategy, as a result of 
improvements in the weapon systems, is likely to pose a threat to the region. China’s 
overall “active defense” military strategy envisions preemptive strikes if another country 
has even hostile “political” ambitions over China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
China’s readiness to use force in Taiwan, South and East China Seas by the 
implementation of “preemptive strategy” causes great concern.135 Accordingly, the 
reason of the PLA’s primary focus in naval warfare is for being able to carry out 
operations in the first and second island chains for “offshore defense” that includes 
Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.136 Thus, improved capabilities may 
facilitate implementation of these strategies and increase the possibility of confrontation 
with other countries. 
Needless to say, China’s improving military capabilities will assist it in 
disputed regions. The PRC may be able to establish a buffer zone to prevent an attack 
while advancing its territorial claims in South and East China Seas.137 Those 
improvements will enable China to take initiative, prevent escalation, and “contain or 
control war” in addition to sustaining sea and area denial, conducting preemptive strikes, 
and  having credible nuclear weapons to deter other nuclear powers when it is 
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necessary.138 Basing on its improving capabilities, China is regarded as increasingly 
assertive in South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea to achieve its goals by 
adequate level of military forces.  
b. Realities versus Prospects 
At the same time, China wants to debilitate the U.S. and other regional 
powers by impeding their activities in Indo-Pacific waters without having to use force if 
it can manage to do so.139 China has a two-sided strategy in East and South China Sea: 
First, “avoiding conflict while deferring solution while being ready to use force to realize 
its claims;” second, defense against threats to its political, economic, and military 
interests in the regions. Because most of the claimants in South China Sea are weaker 
than China, diplomatic means rather than the use of force will be first choice.140 
However, China may still use force against a weaker states at an opportune time when it 
thinks that they are isolated from external support and the way of implementing it will 
not be different from using force against a stronger enemy. Burles and Shulsky argue that 
the confrontation in South China Sea is an exception to this prospect. China may directly 
use force to control the islands contrary to the case with respect to the stronger powers 
against which Beijing would first establish psychological and political superiority until 
growing strong enough to seizure what it wants. However, the using force against even 
the regional weak states seems not feasible in coming decades because Vietnam has 
much more interaction with its neighbors and the West than it had at the times of Spratlys 
Islands confrontation in 1988. After Mischief Reef incident, Philippines has reinforced its 
position by attaining ASEAN’s support and improved relations with the U.S.141 Alastair 
Iain Johnston states that militarily more capable China does not necessarily mean more 
belligerent China.142 However, China’s increasing assertiveness for last decade falsify 
this assumption. Therefore, it could be argued that comparative hard power superiority 
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alone is not enough to encourage a country to behave in belligerent ways. The Chines 
military build-up does not imply use of force to seizure the islands, but strengthen 
China’s bargaining power in the negotiations.143 Thus, the security context is not less 
important variable than the material capabilities. 
B. SECURITY STRUCTURE 
1. Chinese Threat Perception in East Asia  
The perception of the security environment also affects states’ behavior and China 
is not an exception. Obviously, the territorial defense against an imminent surprise attack 
from South and East China Seas and winning local wars under “informationized” 
conditions have required the PLA to improve its capabilities. The perceived U.S. 
containment policy and its military capabilities, the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Japan’s 
resurgent militarism, security alliances between the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries, 
India’s growing influence in South Asia and its regional hegemony are some major 
threats that China perceives in the region.144 Located in the world’s most militarized 
continent, China modernizes its forces to be able to survive in the region and curb the 
adversaries’ influence in the disputed issues. Furthermore, these perceived threats do not 
only necessitate military build-up but also affect PRC’s international behavior.  
Within the security context of the East Asia, China looks for converting its 
economic prosperity into a modernized strong military to close gap with the U.S. 
sophisticated military capabilities and deter Taiwanese pro-independence inclinations.145 
China’s worries about Japan’s “normalization” and abandoning its postwar pacifism also 
shape the CCP policies toward Japan. Chinese leaders fear that hostile attitudes may 
accelerate the rearmament of SDF and stimulate the expansion of Japanese operational 
capabilities which include Taiwan contingency.146 Given the increasing Japanese 
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awareness of Taiwan in the wake of 1995–96 crisis and since the strengthening relations 
between Tokyo and Taipei, especially during Lee Teng-hui’s tenure, China was 
concerned about confronting with Japan in addition to the U.S. in a unilateral attempt 
toward unification.147 Meanwhile, there is a growing apprehension in Japanese thinking 
against China. In addition to the U.S. perennial security assurance against any kind of 
threats, Japan realizes the severe urgency of counterbalancing the Chinese increasing 
military prowess itself as well.148 On the other hand, South Korea’s ambitions to have an 
autonomous strong military have ambiguous implications for ROK’s long-term role in 
the region and its relations with China and the U.S.149  
 
Figure 31.  Strategic Security Situation in East Asia (From Mahadevon, 2012, p. 31). 
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2. Implications of the Security Context for China’s Use of Force Policy   
History suggests the Chinese belligerency within both favorable and unfavorable 
security context. “Anti-Chinese” alliances may alienate Beijing and increase hostility. In 
that case, China may use its economic power as leverage and “punish” them.150 On the 
other hand, in the worst case scenario, disputes in the South China Sea may escalate into 
a large-scale international conflict.151 Historically, China may use force even if the 
military balance is not favorable.152 Relative weakness does not deter China from using 
force. Except for its attempts to control the islands in South China Sea and the attack to 
Vietnam in 1979, its history is replete with examples of military action against superior 
powers.153 China has used force against superior enemies to achieve four goals: (1) 
creating psychological shock by surprise attack, (2) imposing political pressure on the 
enemy by causalities, (3) breaking alliances or collation by political problems, and (4) 
forcing the opponents to choose either surrendering or the escalation.154 China may also 
use force to create a crisis that could produce opportunity besides danger. It may utilize 
the crisis to consolidate its regime as it did during Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958. It could 
try to show its enemies the potential danger of hostility against China and break up the 
alliances among them (Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954–55).155  
The Chinese contemporary regional attitudes with respect to the security structure 
are more ambiguous than its historical behaviors and it is difficult to determine the 
trajectory. Considering the fact that China has displayed declining tendency of using 
force in the territorial dispute, regional countries may see more cooperative China in the 
future, not the continuation of the past. China may behave in decorum toward the other 
claimants despite its increasingly sufficient coercive power. Additionally, if CCP leaders 
adopt the Daoist idea, the growth of the military capabilities may only serve as a 
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deterring factor rather than a destroying power against the enemies. For example, China 
has not declared South China Sea as its “core interest,” but it does not mean the region is 
less important for China. The reason of the absence of the declaration could be China’s 
incapability to defend it, at least for now.156 From another perspective, China may not 
want to provoke the international community further by clarifying its stance in such an 
assertive manner.157 On the other hand, considering China’s sovereignty and sensitivity 
about the territorial integrity, China may behave incongruent with the history and sustain 
its belligerency in the future. Either outcome is possible within the current security 
context.  
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Contrary to the status-discrepancy theory, since the end of the Cold War, China 
did not refrain from resorting to forceful ways to realize its territorial claims. According 
to the theory, Beijing would behave more cooperatively as the gap between its desired 
status and the ascribed status the international community bestows closes. On the 
contrary, its economic and military growths could not close this gap, but encouraged 
China to be harsher in the territorial disputes. However, China’s assertiveness did not 
follow an increasing belligerent trajectory either. Since the end of the Cold War, 
increasing political and economic integration raised the threshold of directly using 
military forces to settle the disputes and forced more cooperative solutions. Regarding the 
regional militarization, it is difficult to determine the effects of military balance on the 
Chinese international crisis behaviors. Comparative military capabilities may both raise 
and lower the threshold. Additionally, alternative energy resources are also candidates to 
raise it. In any case, the threshold of the Chinese use of force in South and East China 
Seas changed.   
A. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Some political and institutional factors have led China’s attitudes to conciliatory 
ways. Regarding the South China Sea, China’s accession to WTO in 2001 and the 
elaboration of ASEAN-China relations have caused China to behave less belligerently in 
disputes. Thanks to the treaties and agreements with ASEAN, China behaved in decorum 
in most of the confrontations and contented itself with diplomatic and administrative 
measures. In the East China Sea, China and Japan took some initiatives to prevent further 
escalations of the tension. Besides that, the U.S. strategic reorientation to Asia and its 
increasing political ties with the regional countries deterred China from increasing 
tensions in both South and East China Seas. Additionally, China’s concerns about being 
perceived as the aggressor side also discouraged Beijing from displaying more assertive 
behaviors. 
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The threshold of using force in East Asia has been higher than in South China 
Sea. When we compare the ratios of the hostility types in South and East China seas, 
China seems to be mostly inclined to display of force rather than use of it in both waters. 
However, its tendency to use force in South China Sea is almost two times greater than in 
East China Sea. While the ratio of displaying force in both seas is much higher than the 
percentage in territorial disputes since 1949, the ratios of use of force in both East and 
South China seas are lower than the previous decades. China’s lower tendency to use 
force in East China Sea could be explained by the U.S. strategic re-orientation to the 
region which may not only increase its political, economic, and military presence but also 
accelerate Japan’s “normalization.” As a result, China may face with a stronger alliance 
in East China Sea, which would certainly raise the threshold of using force, but this 
threshold may also drop very fast considering the Chinese use of force behaviors in the 
past. Until reaching this level, China is likely to continue display its forces rather than 
using them.   
Regarding its confrontational approach, contrary to its relatively amicable posture 
in the first half of the decade, Beijing reacted in forceful ways against the other 
claimants, especially after 2007. The U.S. strategic re-orientation toward Asia and its 
enhancing political relationships with the regional countries irritated and deterred Beijing 
simultaneously. Besides the American presence, the behavior of the regional countries 
also provoked China. In other words, the PLA’s actions have not always been the 
originator of the disputes, but sometimes reactions to the provocations of the other 
claimants. Occasionally, China’s behaviors in South and East China Seas have been 
conjectural and pragmatic. However, when we subtract the U.S. influence from the list of 
the reasons that either promotes conciliation or cause confrontation, there remain more 
factors that favors peaceful relations instead of coercive measures. In other words, China 
did not resort to military force as the immediate way of handling the problems.    
Power transition theory argues that China’s current cooperative manner is 
temporary. When China feels itself strong enough to determine the international order, it 
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will project its power.158 According to neo-realists, China wants to balance against the 
dominant power of the international system. However, China disappoints them about its 
readiness to resort to military force since the end of the Cold War. Besides that, China’s 
MIDs with the U.S., a superpower, increased in 1950s and 1960s during which the United 
States was at the peak of its power and China was not so powerful to challenge the U.S. 
Paradoxically according to this theory, MIDs with the U.S. declined since 1970s despite 
China’s growing power. Since then, super powers were not the most frequent adversaries 
in the Chinese MIDs.159  
B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Economic interdependence is obviously central in both China-Southeast Asian 
countries and China-Japan relations. Considering the fact that tensions and trade relations 
simultaneously increased both in East and South China Seas after the 2008 financial 
crisis, we can conclude that the countries did not allow territorial disputes to weaken their 
trade relations. They tried to keep economic activities insulated from militarized actions 
and, as a result of this logic, regional economic and commercial impact of China’s 
increasing assertiveness during the post-crisis period has not been very negative. On the 
other hand, the countries’ territorial claims continued to play important roles in decision-
makers’ calculations. Therefore, it seems that they will neither let the confrontations 
undermine economic relations nor the bilateral trades and investment soften their 
nationalistic sovereignyty claims. We can anticipate that as long as their mutual 
commercial and financial relations grow, so will the threshold of resorting to coercive 
measures in the confrontations elevate. Thus, there seems to emerge a two-sided strategy. 
China is not likely to escalate the conflicts to a point where the confrontation may stymie 
the economic relations in East China Sea while being determined to expolit the other 
claimants’ dependence on the commercial and financial ties with Bejing in South China 
Sea.  
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Different from the case in South China Sea, China-Japan confrontation and their 
bilateral economic relations are not independent from each other. The Japanese FDI 
started to increase after dipping in 1999 throughout the first half of the 2000s, during 
which the tension between China and Japan was at the lower levels. China’s two-sided 
approach as described above can explain this difference between East and South China 
Seas. While China has deescalated the tension in East China Sea to protect the economic 
gains, it is not refraining from intensifying the tension in South China Sea to exploit the 
adversaries’ dependence on economic relations with China.  
C. ENERGY    
China’s increasing energy demand has determined its energy security policies. 
Therefore, China’s need to secure energy supply lanes, especially through South China 
Sea, energy exploration activities in East and South China seas, and the exclusively 
possession of large amount of HREE reserves in South China are likely to sustain PRC’s 
belligerency. On the other hand, if its efforts to diversify energy supplies by utilizing 
unconventional resources give fruit and it increases the share of non-fossil fuel energy in 
its total energy consumption, we can expect decrease in its assertiveness. For now, the 
alternative energy resources are not capable enough to raise the threshold of using 
military power needed to secure the energy transportation routes, but every attempt to 
increase the share of this resource in the total consumption would contribute to the 
Chinese conciliatory approaches to the issue.  
D. MILITARY BALANCE AND SECURITY CONTEXT 
As a result of China’s growing military capabilities, it is widely believed that 
China may display more assertive behavior after feels confident about its military power. 
Moreover, China’s transforming military strategy, as a result of improvements in the 
weapon systems, is likely to pose threat to the region. China’s overall “active defense” 
military strategy envisions preemptive strikes if another country has even hostile 
“political” ambitions over China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Additionally, the 
U.S. military presence and alliances with the regional countries, regional powers’ 
modernization and procurements efforts, the Japanese “normalization” attempts, and 
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China’s relatively more capable military forces in especially in South China Sea increase 
the possibility of a large-scale military confrontation. These are the escalatory factors of 
tension and the facilitator of the use of military force.  
Apparently, even if China tries to avoid severe conflict and to defer a solution, it 
will be ready to use force to realize its claims. Beijing may utilize diplomatic ways as the 
first choice because the claimants in South China Sea are weaker than China.160 
However, China may still use force against weaker states at an opportune time when it 
thinks that they are isolated from external support and the way of implementing it will 
not be different from using force against a stronger enemy. History provides us examples 
of Chinese belligerency within both favorable and unfavorable security contexts. “Anti-
Chinese” alliances may alienate Beijing and increase hostility. In that case, China may 
use its economic power as leverage and “punish” them.161 On the other hand, in the worst 
case scenario, the disputes in the South China Sea may escalate into a large-scale 
international conflict. The Chinese contemporary regional attitudes with respect to the 
security structure and military balance are more ambiguous than its historical behaviors 
and it is difficult to determine the trajectory. 
Factors and Trends 
                          Trend 
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Conciliatory Confrontational 
Political and Institutional  1. Relations with ASEAN 
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Solutions 
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1. Provocations of 
Regional Countries 
2. The U.S. Strategic 
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3. The U.S. Political 
Relations with the 
Regional States 
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4. The U.S. Military 
Presence 
5. Military Upgrading 
Efforts of the Regional 
States 
6. Comparative Strength 
of the Claimants 
7. The U.S. Alliance 




E. POSSIBLE WAYS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION 
Although East Asia is described as possessing “mismatched development of 
economic integration and political cooperation,” the past two decades show us that 
economic interdependence has lowered the tension of the confrontations and limited the 
competition.162 The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or SCO type of organizations that 
have security dimension in addition to the others may bring together all related sides and 
serve as platform on which Asian security architecture can be built. Given the distribution 
of information inside an organization about the national capabilities of the member states, 
the distribution of power cannot have any effect on the possibility of a military conflict. 
In other words, the flow of information among the member states reduces the possibility 
of a military conflict. However, outside the alliance, where there is limited amount of 
information, the distribution of power has much more effects on the probability of 
military conflict.163  
F. INEVITABILITY OF CONFRONTATION  
  Currently, “contradictory regional dynamics” are shaping Asia-Pacific region. 
While the regional countries, together with the U.S., are establishing multilateral 
economic and security relation to promote cooperation, there is also increasing 
“polarization” between the U.S. and China. Developments in China such as economic 
slow-down, militant nationalism, and adventurous military could dictate China to behave 
in confrontational manners in security issues in the future.164 In other words, China’s 
behaviors in South China Sea and East China Seas will be challenging due to its growing 
military capabilities, increasing energy needs, and nationalism toward Japan.165 
Therefore, in a world where the rise of China continues economically, politically, and 
militarily, and territorial issues unfold in conflictual ways, China may never withdraw 
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from confrontation and certainly struggle to realize its national interests. Therefore, 
although there is decreasing tendency of using force and there are initiatives to diminish 
it further, it seems impossible to eradicate the possibility of armed clashes.   
G. OTHER FACTORS 
  Today, Beijing decisions are highly influenced by some non-governmental or 
quasi-governmental agencies such as oil companies, fishermen, scientists, five maritime 
law enforcement agencies, and local governments.166 Because the local PLA forces are 
not under the close control of civilian and military leaders, some unplanned and 
uncontrolled incidents and crises occurred. For example, PLAN submarine intrusion into 
Japanese territorial waters in 2004, some ship and aircraft maneuvers in disputed waters 
in East China, and military clashes in South China Sea in 1874 and 1988. These 
unintended actions weaken the senior-level officials’ initiatives in managing the crisis. 
The other problem is lack of coordination between diplomatic and military decisions in a 
crisis.167  
Regarding the domestic factors, public opinion which is widely expressed through 
Internet and media became increasingly important in the Chinese politics. The Chinese 
nationalism and history nourish people’s sentiments in favor of conservative approaches. 
On the other hand, the PLA’s influence on the Chinese domestic politics also has 
implications on Beijing’s international relations. For example, some analysts believe that 
the occupation of Mischief Reef was the consequence of some PLA commanders’ 
decisions. Jiang Zemin tolerated them while he consolidated his own position in a period 
of political transition.168 Indeed, there is a symbiotic relation with the use of force policy 
and these domestic factors and they should be considered in a comprehensive 
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perspective. Therefore, in addition to regional political, economic, energy, and military 
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